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Abstract
We consider a cognitive radio network in which a base station
provides opportunistic unlicensed spectrum access for secondary base
stations to transmit data to their subscribers. The primary user may
decide to release some parts of its bandwidth for the use of secondary
users. As a result, secondary users pay a fee to the primary user
based on the interference they make. Considering cognitive radios,
we propose and analyze a framework, whereby a primary user has the
possibility to release its channel to a secondary network in exchange
for money. On one Hand the primary user attempts to maximize its
payoff, while on the other hand, secondary users try to minimize the
money they pay to the primary user and maximize their own payoff.
The investigated model is conveniently cast in the framework of Stack-
elberg games. Our simulation consists of two major parts. First there
is a negotiation among the secondary network nodes about the distri-
bution of secondary channels. In this part, we use social optimum of
secondary network as the negotiation result. Second, we consider a
Stackelberg game between the primary user and the secondary network
in which the primary user wants to maximize its payoff by increasing
its cost or the number of channels available for the secondary network.
1 Introduction
Recently the FCC reported that there are huge temporal and spatial varia-
tions in the usage of the allocated spectrum. This stimulates the notion of
opportunistic unlicensed spectrum access, which lets the secondary cognitive
radio networks opportunistically make use of the underutilized spectrum.
Although by allowing opportunistic spectrum access, the spectrum exploita-
tion will get better, transmission from a cognitive radio network can interfer
with the primary user as well. Thus, important design criteria for cognitive
radio comprise of maximizing the spectrum exploitation and minimizing the
interference caused to primary user.
To alleviate the problem, we consider a cognitive radio network that con-
sists of multiple cells. Within each cell, there is a cell head (CH) supporting
a set of fixed cognitive radios (CRs). We consider the downlink scenario and
the spectrum of interest is divided into a set of non-overlapping channels
divided into two parts by the primary user. The first part is for use of the
primary user itself and the second part can be shared with the cognitive radio
network. Each CR can be either active or idle and a CH needs exactly one
channel to serve each active CR.
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For each cognitive radio in the secondary network the received signal
to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) must exceed a predefined threshold,
which depends on the radio module of cognitive radio to be able to recon-
struct data from the received radio message. Here, we assume the primary
user release some channels for CHs. The payoff of a CH is the number of
CRs that can be supported by using at least one of its allocated channels.
The primary user will gain profit based on the interference that CHs make at
a specific point in the network field. We use two game theory concepts: one
in the secondary network where we devise social optimum and a Stackelberg
game between secondary network and the primary user to find the optimum
number of channel released by the primary user in forms of revenue.
What we have down is comparably a new way of using Stackelberg game
in such networks. Previously [5],in Stackelberg games were used in the case of
licensed bandwidth where the secondary network makes use of a distributed
space-time coding (DSTC)[3] or the primary user, instead they could gain
amount of bandwidth for its inter-network communication. They used Stack-
elberg game to find the optimum fractions of bandwidth that should be re-
leased for the secondary network; moreover, in the secondary network, nodes
play a non-cooperative power control game and choose their transmitting
power according to Nash equilibrium. The Stackelberg model that they used
is the same as ours, but our cooperation model is different from them.
The rest of this report is structured as follows; we first introduce basic
concepts of game theory and Stackelberg games and explain how to solve
such games. Then, we examine a cognitive radio as described earlier.
2 Game Theory
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that is used in the social
sciences. Game theory is the study of problems of conflict and cooperation
among independent decision-makers.
2.1 Essential Concepts in Game Theory [6]
A game is defined by the triplet G = (P, S, U)
• Player
A player is an agent who makes decisions in a game.
• Strategy
In a game in strategic form, a strategy is one of the given possible
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actions of a player.
• Payoff
A payoff is a number, also called utility, which reflects the desirability
of an outcome to a player, for whatever reason.
• Rationality
A player is said to be rational if he seeks to play in a manner, which
maximizes his own payoff. It is often assumed that the rationality of
all players is common knowledge.
We concentrate on dynamic games of complete information, mostly on
Stackelberg model, since it is the main part of our cooperation model.
2.2 Dynamic Games of Complete Information
In this subset players’ payoff are common knowledge among them. This
branch consists of two kinds of games:
1. Perfect Information
At each turn the player owing the turn knows the full history of the
game. In other words, a player knows the strategy of its opponents in
the past.
2. Imperfect Information
Players do not know the full history of the game or simpley, a player
may not know exactly previous choices.
It is worth noticing that the main issue in this kind of game is credibility[1],
which means that in every move that any player takes he thinks players
previous moves were based on maximization of their utilities.
We focus on Stackelberg game, which is a branch of dynamic game of
complete and perfect information game, but before go deeply in that area,
we cast a look at backward induction, since it has an important role in
Stackelberg games.
2.2.1 Backward Induction
Backward induction is a technique to solve a game of perfect information. It
first considers the last moves of the game, and determines the best move for
the player in each case. Then, taking these as given future actions, it proceeds
backwards in time, again determining the best move for the respective player,
until the beginning of the game is reached [6]. The key features of a dynamic
game of complete and perfect information are:
4
• The moves are in sequence
• All pervious moves are known before the next move is taken place
• For each combination of players moves, payoffs are common knowledge[1]
Games with these characteristics are solved by backward induction. Back-
ward induction is used to find Stackelberg games’ equilibriums, thus we de-
scribe how to solve a two-level backward induction.
• Player 1 chooses an action a1 from the A1.
• Player 2 chooses an action a2 from the A2.
• Payoffs are u1(a1, a2) and u2(a1, a2).
When it is player 2’s action time, he will face following problem, given the
action a1 previously chosen by player 1:
max
a2∈A2
u2(a1, a2)
R2(a1) is player 2’s best reaction tworad player 1 . Since both players can
predict each other action, player 1’s action at the first stage is
max
a1∈A1
u1(a1, R2(a1))
If we assume player 1’s best action is a∗1, we call (a
∗
1, R2(a
∗
1)) the backwards-
induction outcome of the game.
The backward induction is again based on credibility. That is player 1 knows
player 2 moves is in a way that player 2 will recieve maximum payoff based
on player one moves.
2.3 Stackelberg Game [1]
The Stackelberg model in economy consists of a leader firm which moves first
and a follower firm which moves after. The Stackelberg model is solved by
finding the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium1 of the game. To calculate
SPNE we first need to find the best reaction of follower to any quantity of
its leader, thus we use backward induction to solve this kind of game. In
a Stackelberg game the leader announces its strategy and follower responds
1A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is a set of strategies {si, i = 1, . . . , n}
such that for each subgame g, the set of induced strategies {si(g), i = 1, . . . , n} forms a
Nash equilibrium for this subgame
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to it rationally, as far as the leader knows the follower cost function, it can
compute follower’s reaction to all of its strategies. The timing of a Stackelberg
game is as follows: [1]
1. Leader chooses a quantity q1 > 0
2. Follower observes q1 and then chooses a quantity q2 > 0
3. Payoff for player i is:
ui(qi, qj) = [P (q1 + q2)− Ci(qi)]qi
Price for firms is P (q1 + q2) which is simply the function of total output.
Moreover, we suppose that firm i has cost function as Ci(qi).
We use backward induction to solve a Stackelberg game, thus first we need
to calculate the follower best response to an arbitrary quantity of leader.
max
q2>0
u2(q1, q2) = [P (q1 + q2)− C2(q2)]q2
The values of q2 satisfying this response are follower’s best response. For
the best responses of the leader we need to find the follower best responses
as a function of the leader possible actions, R2(q1), and then maximize the
leader payoff;
max
q1>0
u1(q1, R2(q1)) = [P (q1 +R2(q1))− C1(q1)]q1
These two maximizations can easily be found by just a derivation of each
payoff with respect to its given quantity and put the result equal to zero and
find the respective value that satisfies the resulting expression. To have a
better understanding of the problem we bring an example.
Supposing that the cost functions of both leader and follower are zero that is
C1(q1) and C2(q2) are equal to zero; moreover, the inverse demand function
is P (q1 + q2) = A − B(q1 + q2) (A and B are constants). q∗1 and q∗2 are the
leader and follower best answers.
u2(q1, q2) = (A−Bq1)q2 −Bq22
and player 2 best reaction is;
∂u2
∂q2
= 0 −→ R2(q1) = A−Bq1
2B
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firm 1’s best answer will be;
u1 =
A
2
q1 − B
2
q21
so;
∂u1
∂q1
= 0 −→ q∗1 = 2q∗2 =
A
2B
As a result in a two-player Stackelberg game we have these characteristics;
• Cost function of each player depends on the both players strategies.
• Each player tries to minimize its cost function.
2.3.1 One leader many followers [4]
Most Stackelberg games consist of a leader and a follower that replies to
leader strategy “rationally” by selecting a strategy that minimizes its cost
function. But if we have more than one follower, we cannot distinctively
reveal what is meant by “rational” response of the followers. As a result, the
leader should know not only the followers cost function but also their “mood
of play” which can be of two kinds non-cooperative or cooperative. In non-
cooperative mode among followers we can consider their Nash equilibrium
as their strategy in response to a leaders strategy. In case of cooperation we
can use Pareto optimal as a case of modeling.
3 Problem Definition
3.1 System Model
We consider an opportunistic spectrum access scenario depicted in Fig. 1.
The primary user divides the spectrum of interest to K channels, and primary
user releases some of the channels for secondary network. In the same area, a
cognitive radio network is set up. This cognitive network consists of B cells.
Within each cell, there is a cell head (CH) serving a number of fixed cognitive
radios. We consider the downlink scenario in which data are transmitted from
CHs to CRs. Our objective is to find a channel/power allocation scheme that
maximize both CHs and BS payoff.
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Figure 1: Deployment of a cognitive radio network. Dashed lines are cells’
boundary.
3.2 Operational Requirements
3.2.1 SNR
Let Gci be the channel power gain from the CH serving CRi on channel c.
Let P ci be the transmit power toward CRi on channel c. If channel c is not
assigned for the transmission toward CRi, P
c
i = 0 but if it is assigned we
have [2]
γci =
GciP
c
i
N0
Where N0 is noise spectral density of each CR. For a reliable transmission
toward CRi it is essential;
γci ≥ γmin
In practice, γmin is the minimum SNR required to reach a certain bit
error rate (BER) for each CR.
3.2.2 Payoff
We have two payoff functions one for primary user and another for secondary
users. CH in the Secondary network choose those payoff functions that stasify
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U seci ≥ α
Where U seci is payoff function for secondary network, α is a minimum
payoff for a secondary CH to accept this payoff as an accountable channel
allocation, and x is CHi membership fee for each of its user. Payoff functions
for the whole network are:
U seci =
CRi
N
×Xi −
CRi∑
j=1
Pj ×GBSi
CHCRsi∑
j=1
Pj ×GBSi
× Y
Upri =
B∑
i=1
CRi∑
j=1
Pj ×GBSi
CHCRsi∑
j=1
Pj ×GBSi
× Y
where CHCRsi is total number of CRs in cell number i, N is total number of
CRs in the whole network, B is total number of cells in the network, CRi is
the umber of CRs that CHi is supported, Pj denotea the transmit power for
the transmission toward CRj form its respective CH, U
sec
i is payoff function
of CHi, U
pri is payoff function of primary user, Xi is membership cost of
CHi, Y is primary user cost, which is based on interference that a secondary
network makes at a certain point, and GBSi is channel gain from CHi to the
primary user. Parameters are described in Table 1.
4 Stackelberg model based channel allocation
In this section, we provide some insight into the performance and analysis of
the channel allocation. In particular we are interested in condition in which it
is advantageous for the primary user to release its channels for the secondary
network.
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Symbol Definition
CHCRsi Total number of CRs in cell number i
N Total number of CRs in the whole network
B Total number of cells in the network
CRi Number of CRs that CHi is supported
Pj Denote the transmit power for the transmission
toward CRj form its respective CH
U seci Payoff function of CHi
Upri Payoff function of primary user
Xi Membership cost of CHi
Y Cost for attaining a channel from primary
GBSi Channel gain from CHi to primary user
Table 1: List of symbols and definition in our system model.
4.1 Performance
Channel allocation is based on Stackelberg and Social optimum equilibri-
ums.2. Timing of channel allocation is as follow. Firstly, BS releases some
channels for the use of secondary network and secondary networks CHs ne-
gotiate with each other and based on their negotiation they choose CRs that
make the whole secondary network pay minimum possible cost to the primary
user. They use social optimum equilibrium of the game to maximize their
payoffs and as the result minimize the cost function of the whole network.
On the other hand, primary user tries to maximize its payoff so, it changes
the cost that it receives from secondary network for the power that each CH
puts at a certain point in the network. Totally, primary user maximizes its
payoff by finding the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game.
4.2 Analysis
In this part, we determine conditions in which the primary user can maximize
its payoff while secondary user can also take part in a game and maximize
their payoff. The problem is solved by noticing that
U sec =
B∑
i=1
U seci
U seci ≥ α
 =⇒ U sec ≥ B × α
2Allocation in which is Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimum happen simultaneously
and the secondary network payoff is maximum.
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K ≥ CRi
Thus
U sec(CRi, Y, Pj) =
B∑
i=1
CRi ×Xi
N
− Upri(CRi, Y, Pj)
Lemma At the social optimum point, the secondary network uses all the
channels available and support CRs that are close to their respective CHs.
Proof From the payoff of the secondary network, we can understand that
if the number of supported CRs is increased, the payoff of the secondary net-
work will be increased. So, the secondary network uses all released channels,
because the total number of supported CRs is equal or less than released
channels. Moreover, the secondary networks CHs negotiate with each other
to select CRs that are closer to CHs, since they want to decrease the inter-
ference of supporting CRs. As a result, all channels will be used and the
closest CRs will be chosen.
U sec ≥ B × α→
B∑
i=1
CRopti ×Xi
N
− Upri(CRopti , Y, P optj ) ≥ B × α
Thus
Upri(CRopti , Y, P
opt
j ) ≤
B∑
i=1
CRopti ×Xi
N
−B × α
Upri(CRopti , Y, P
opt
j ) is maximized if it is equal to the right hand side so,
Y opt =
B∑
i=1
CRopti ×Xi
N
−B × α
B∑
i=1
CRopti∑
j=1
P optj ×GBSi
CHCRsi∑
j=1
Pj ×GBSi
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It is worth to mention that in the secondary network there is a trade of
among Pj, Xi for each CH, since CHs negotiate with each other to choose
CR that make all these parameter less.
5 Numerical Example
5.1 Simulation Model
The system model used in our simulation is as follows. We consider a square
field of size 100× 100m in which cognitive radios are randomly distributed.
The area is divided to B = 4 cells and within each cell there is a randomly
distributed CH. The total number of CRs is N = 40. A sample network is
shown in Fig. 1.
We model a frequency division multiple access (FDMA) system in which
the entire bandwidth is divided into K = 5, . . . , 10 channels. The path loss
exponent is taken to be 4. The primary user measurement point for the
power of the secondary network is (50, 50). Each CH randomly chooses one
channel and uses it.
The noise power spectrum density at each CR is N0 = −100dBm. The
required SNR at each CR is 50dB. The minimum acceptable threshold for
each CH is α = 0.00001. Xi is a randomly selected number less than 1 and
Y gets number less than 4.
5.2 Simulation Analysis
For each released channel numbers, the secondary network computes all the
possible allocation, for example, if number of released channel is equal to
5, then possible allocation is equal to 126. For all these allocations the
secondary networks CH compute their payoff for a fixed primary user rate.
They find the Pareto optimum, and Nash equilibrium (NE) of these possible
allocations. The equilibrium, which is not only NE, and Pareto optimum but
also the secondary network payoff is maximum is social optimum of those
allocations. The secondary network strategy, the chosen channel allocation,
goes to the primary user. The primary user increases its cost in order to
maximize its payoff for that specific released channels and declares its new
cost to the secondary network. This algorithm continues until the secondary
network does not choose any channel allocation, since the newly declared cost
by the primary user passes the payoff threshold of the secondary network.
Then the primary user changes the number of released channels and starts
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the algorithm for the recently released channels.
In Fig. 2 we plotted Upri versus Y for a fixed number of released channels
which is equal to 5. We deduct that primary user payoff will be increased
linearly as primary cost is increased until the point that cost is too much
that that the secondary network will not choose any allocation, which leads
to the zero payoff of the primary user.
In Fig. 3 we plotted U sec versus Y is like the last plot for a channel
allocation equal to 5. As we expected the secondary network payoff decreases,
when the primary user cost is increased and the secondary network payoff
goes to zero, when the primary user cost is too high that causes the secondary
network payoff to go below the threshold.
In Fig. 4 we plotted optimum Upri versus the number of released chan-
nels. We see that as the channel number is increased, the primary optimum
payoff augment as well. In addition, from channel number equal to 9 or
higher primary user payoff is constant. We proved that the secondary net-
work uses all the released channels, but when the number of released channels
is growing, the secondary network’s CHs support CRs that are farther from
their respective CH. This support causes more interference on the primary
user measurement point. So, the secondary network payoff goes below the
threshold sooner comparing to when number of released channel is less. To-
tally, the primary user cannot increase its cost as much that it could for less
number of released channels, which leads to decrease in the payoff of the
primary user comparing to pervious number of released channels.
Fig. 5 shows the optimum primary user cost versus the number released
channel. The optimum value for the primary user is constant, until the point
that more released channels lead to support CRs that are too far from their
respective CH. As the result the optimum primary user cost will decrease.
Although it seems that if the primary user releases more channels it can
have higher payoff, the simulation results show that this is not always pos-
sible, releasing more channels in order to maximize the payoff, and depends
on the position of CRs in the secondary network. So, having more released
channels can decrease the primary user payoff as well. Totally, the primary
user should release more number of channels until the point that the sec-
ondary network payoff does not go below its threshold. What we understand
from the simulation results are in correspondence with the analysis that we
modeled.
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Figure 2: Primary user payoff versus the primary user cost, number of
released channels equal to 5. The primary user measurement point is at
(50, 50).
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Figure 3: Secondary network cost versus the primary user cost. The Number
of released channels is fixed and equal to 5. Measurement point is at (50, 50).
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Figure 4: Optimum primary user payoff for each channel allocation versus
the number of released channels. Measurement point is at (50, 50).
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Figure 5: Maximum primary user cost for each channel allocation versus the
number of released channels. Measurement point is at (50, 50).
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6 Related work
There are many applications of game theory in wireless communication, and
researchers have tried to solve many problems in wireless communication by
using of game theory. For example; spectrum sharing for unlicensed Band;
maximizing spectrum utilization of cognitive radio network using channel al-
location and power control, and spectrum leasing to cooperating secondary
ad hoc networks are some of game theory application in wireless communi-
cation. The most related one to ours is the last one, and we will explicitly
explain it .
6.1 Spectrum leasing to cooperating secondary ad hoc
networks [5]
The primary user will release a fraction of its bandwidth, in exchange for
enhancement in its equality of service by the secondary network. In turn,
the secondary nodes can decide to cooperate or not with the primary user
on the basis of the amount of cooperation required by the primary and the
corresponding fraction bandwidth released for the secondary nodes.
The primary link may lease a fraction of its bandwidth for the secondary
nodes in exchange the secondary network will have cooperation with the
primary user in the form of transmission via distributed space-time coding.
The fraction of bandwidth released for secondary nodes is divided into
two parts. The first part is used to relay primary node data to destination;
the second part can be used for the secondary activity. In this subset sec-
ondary transmitters participate in a game for transmission to their respective
receivers by performing decentralized power control. Each secondary node
tries to maximize its utility function that account for the cost and benefit be-
tween the power needed for transmission and the quality of service. A small
fraction of bandwidth may not worth for the secondary nodes to use it to
transmit their data to their respective receivers, since they cannot overcome
the expense that they should pay for these transmissions. The outcome of
this decentralized game can be described by Nash equilibrium of the game.
The primary decides over the amount of its cooperation with the sec-
ondary network by observing the output of the secondary nodes. Stackelberg
game can use to illustrate this kind of game.
Our goal has some similarities with this paper and it is based on a Stack-
elberg game as well, but there is some dissimilarity, we used FDMA for
channel allocation, instead of CDMA. As the result there is no interference
for channel allocation, additionally, the cooperation between two networks is
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by quality of service, alternatively the secondary nodes should pay money to
the primary user, since they use the primary users channels.
7 Conclusion
In this report, we consider the problem of channel allocation to maximize
the spectrum utilization of a primary user in exchange for negotiation with a
cognitive radio network. As the result of this negotiation, the secondary net-
work can use the unused spectrum of the primary user to have some services
for its users and simultaneously pays to the primary user based on power
that these services cause at a defined point. By casting the problem in the
framework of Stackelberg games, we have provided analytical and numerical
results that have confirmed the considered model as a promising paradigm
for cognitive radio networks and could find the Stackelberg equilibrium of
the game, in which the primary user can have its maximum payoff.
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